Chapter 4

Liberals and Caudillos in the Post-Rosas Interregnum

Accounting for the transition in the Río de la Plata from the loosely confederated, caudillo-ruled, and intermittently warring provinces of the early independent Plata to the federally centralized Argentine Republic from the 1860s on involves two separate but converging lines of inquiry. The preceding chapter examined the conditions under which caudillo rule, fragmented sovereignty, and militaristic political practices arose and persisted. This chapter addresses a subsequent set of problems: the downfall of Rosas, the crisis of caudillismo, and the emergence of a national state in Argentina under a federal constitution that underpinned civilian rule and a politics of parties, elections, and parliamentary activity.

Even in the immediate decades after independence, political actors in the Argentine provinces were not altogether unfamiliar with the notion of a federal, parliamentary, constitutional republic. Early attempts to write constitutions for a unitary (1816-19) or federally

centralized (1824-26) state were largely inspired by the example of the successful construction of the U.S. federal republic in North America. But such efforts were stillborn and gave way to a quarter century of fragmented sovereignty and civil war. In Buenos Aires province, the personalist regime of the caudillo Rosas snuffed out a nascent public sphere and supplanted the Rivadavian experiment in constitutional governance. Still, as a consequence of the experience of the 1820s and the persistence of certain of its remnants into the 1830s and 40s (González Bernaldo 1992), Argentine actors in the 1850s did have certain models to look back upon for guidance. Indeed, older members of the post-Rosas political generation were likely to have participated in or lived under the Rivadavia regime in their youth.

This chapter argues, however, that two additional features of the mid-century political landscape -- besides the availability of models, examples, or experiences drawn from the Argentine past -- were crucial to the emergence of a national state with a parliamentary regime: first, the presence in Buenos Aires after 1852 of a network of elite

individuals who in the 1840s had gained practical experience as exiles in the parliamentary and public-sphere politics of other countries. Returning after the fall of Rosas, they sought to forge an Argentine national state in which such practices could become the norm of political life.

Second -- and equally crucial -- were the changes in the global and local political economy that created a context conducive to the adoption of (or acquiescence in) such practices by the dominant class and at the same time provided material resources that facilitated the success of the Buenos AiresBcentered statebuilding project. These two sets of political and economic processes proved to be mutually reinforcing during the conjuncture of the 1850s.

The rise of wool

We turn first to an examination of the economic changes. In the North Atlantic core region of industrializing capitalism and in the Plata region peripheral to it, shifts during the 1840s and 50s brought forth a new mix of constraints and opportunities for both landed producers and political actors. On the pampas, the post-Independence economy based on maintaining herds of

free-ranging cattle and exporting hides and salted beef seemed to be approaching a dead end. While hide production continued to expand modestly through 1860, it substantially exceeded the demand of North Atlantic markets. Producers also faced increasing competition from the southern Brazilian province of Rio Grande do Sul. Salted beef went almost entirely to Brazil and Cuba for slave consumption, and those markets too were largely stagnant.

Meanwhile, the world market for wool was expanding apace. Ongoing innovations in textile production in Britain and elsewhere were making it possible for woollen goods to be produced industrially alongside cotton. Power looms had been adapted for woollen production, and the combing machine enabled spinning mills to make use of wools of lower quality. (Jenkins and Ponting 1982: 108) The vertiginous expansion of the British woollen industry can be grasped in the following figures given by Brown (1979: 62):

	1836	1855
Factories	415	511
Horsepower	7,166	14,481
Spindles	--	1,298,326

Power looms	2,768	38,819
Persons employed	31,607	86,690

Industrial demand for raw wool thus quickly outstripped what could be supplied from the flocks of the British Isles or North America. This new market offered opportunities to producers in far-flung peripheral areas -- Australia and New Zealand, southern Peru, and the Argentine pampas. Substantially greater profits were available to those estancieros willing to innovate by diversifying from cattle products into wool production. The Argentine "wool boom" was under way; the landscape of Buenos Aires province and adjacent regions was transformed as burgeoning flocks of sheep displaced range-fed cattle to the interior frontiers.

Unlike cattle, sheep could not go to market on the hoof, but wool's high value in relation to its bulk still made it profitable to transport by oxcart or wagon up to about 80 miles. This was roughly the outer limit of the sheep ring in Buenos Aires province through the 1860s. Improved land transport thus does not seem to have been an absolute prerequisite for the expansion of wool production on the pampas; the opening of the wool boom predates the

onset of major rail construction in the later 1860s. Early railroads ran mostly within an 80-mile radius of the coast, and only those that served the sheep zones province produced immediate profits. (Rock 1985: 146; Gorostegui de Torres 1972: 115) (Schwartz 1986: 455-56) Even in the landlocked province of Córdoba, where improvements in overland transport were wholly lacking, wool production tripled in the 1850s. (Schwartz 1986: 446, citing Scobie 1964: 42) Construction of a rail line from Córdoba city to the Paraná River port of Rosario was nonetheless an unrealized aim of the Argentine Confederation during the 1850s. (Gorostegui de Torres 1972: 115; Rock 1985: 145)

Whereas natural boundaries such as rivers and streams sufficed for keeping cattle herds in check, the higher value of the sheep and their greater vulnerability to predators made it desirable to fence off pastures. The first documented instance of man-made fencing on the pampas was in 1845; by 1861 Argentine imports of fencing wire amounted to 400,000 kilos and by 1863 reached 1.5 million. (Slatta 1983: 18; Macchi 1974: 32; Sbarra 1973) Capital investment rose further as greater attention was paid to wool quality and

breeding stock was imported. Additional capital had to be secured for the construction of facilities for rending sheep carcasses into tallow and for equipment used to pack the wool for shipping. (Brown 1979: 140)

The conversion of cattle estancias to sheep farms entailed a marked expansion of the labor force. Where the cattle herds of a typical estancia might have been tended by a dozen or so mounted gauchos, the 100,000 sheep now installed on the same range would be divided into flocks of two to three thousand, each cared for by a relatively sedentary shepherd and his family. (Macchi 1974: 12-13) Additional labor was required during the shearing season. Density of settlement roughly tripled on the lands converted to sheep. (Lamia 1979: 100) Immigrants with the requisite skills from Britain, Ireland, and Spain now could gain employment as foremen and farm managers and even acquire flocks of their own. (Korol and Sábato 1981: 33-49; Rock 1985: 133)

At the outset of the wool boom, land units in the sheepraising zone became more subdivided. Under a share system whereby the foreman of a sheep ranch typically

received one-quarter to one-third of the flock increase and the fleece, enterprising immigrants could rent land and set up their own sheep farms within three or four years.[1] (Lamia 1979: 101; Korol and Sábato 1981: 102-03) The wool boom thus facilitated the modest growth of a rural middle class, attenuating the landlord/gaucho polarization that had typified the Rosas period.

The fall of Rosas

During the intermittent blockades of Buenos Aires by French and/or British naval forces in the 1840s, producers in the upriver provinces of Entre Ríos and Corrientes prospered by shipping wool, hides, and salted meat directly to Atlantic markets using ports on the Río Uruguay. As early as 1845, raw wool was being shipped from Concepción del Uruguay in Entre Ríos. (Macchi 1974: 17). So long as Rosas remained in power in Buenos Aires, however, river navigation in particular and economic development in general faced recurring political obstruction. Matters reached a crisis point in 1850 when Rosas -- having settled his conflicts with the European powers -- launched a fresh attempt to enforce a monopoly for Buenos Aires over river

transport and customs revenue. No longer willing to tolerate porteño pretensions, upriver producers and their caudillo patrons began to seek allies for a confrontation with Rosas.

Governor Justo José de Urquiza of Entre Ríos, in earlier times a staunch lieutenant of Rosas, had grown particularly wealthy as an agrarian exporter and contraband merchant under the European blockades. He owned the biggest estancias in Entre Ríos, with several hundred square miles of fine grazing land. His San José estate alone had some 50,000 sheep by the early 1850s. (Lynch 1981: 315)

Quick to perceive and adjust to the altered circumstances, Urquiza proclaimed 1851 to be Argentina's "year of organization" and forged a coalition with his counterparts in Corrientes, the Brazilian Empire, the besieged regime of Montevideo, and the Unitarians and other Argentine exiles who had remained in that city in hope of an opportunity to confront Rosas. (Lynch 1981: 305; Saldías 1988: II,48; Demicheli 1971: 260-64, 522-25) All these disparate elements contributed forces to Urquiza's *Ejército Grande de Sur América* (Grand Army of South America), which

lifted the siege of Montevideo in 1851 and then invaded Buenos Aires province.

Meanwhile, Rosas's position at home had begun to erode as the merchant-estancieros of Buenos Aires discovered that the labor, technical, and capital requirements of sheep farming were substantially less elastic than those of cattle ranching. They had become less willing to acquiesce in warfare that drained already scarce ranching personnel and diverted resources away from the defense and extension of the interior frontiers. Further, as North Atlantic markets became increasingly central to these producers, they became more attuned to the prospect of foreign investment in railroad construction and public debt instruments and perceived the Rosas regime as an obstacle thereto. The diminishing gains and mounting costs of interprovincial conflict thus diluted the willingness of Buenos Aires's dominant class to contribute personnel and resources to Rosas's persistence in power.

In January 1852, Urquiza's army scattered Rosas's troops at the battle of Caseros, on the outskirts of Buenos Aires city. Rosas thereupon fled to a British frigate and

departed for a long and placid exile in the English countryside, where he raised cattle on the archaic estancia model. (Rube 1978: Chs. 4, 10; Lynch 1981: 327-35, 345-48)

Return of the exiles

The fall of Rosas shattered the political equilibrium throughout the Río de la Plata and opened up space for the emergence of new forms of political action. In particular, it enabled important groups of political entrepreneurs to return to Buenos Aires and intervene in Argentine politics. These included both aging Unitarians of the 1820s generation and a younger cohort of liberals influenced by mid-century European doctrines. Their experiences in the 1840s -- including travel and/or political participation in Chile, Montevideo, Western Europe, and the United States -- had schooled key individuals among these challengers in a repertoire of practices quite distinct from those prevalent in the Plata during the Rosas epoch. While by no means inexperienced in the militaristic practices of the caudillos nor disinclined to make use of them when it served their larger purpose, they preferred practices located in or directed to the public sphere -- newspaper and pamphlet

propaganda, political clubs, election campaigns (including vote fraud and manipulation), parliamentary maneuvering, and factional diplomacy.

Upon returning to Buenos Aires, the liberals and Unitarians set about creating such a public sphere around themselves, launching newspapers, organizing clubs, and opening their homes for political salons.[2] Their vision of economic and social progress based on free trade, foreign capital, and European immigration attracted an urban constituency among lawyers, public employees, merchants, and certain landed producers resident in Buenos Aires city. "Perhaps the day is not far off," an editorial on public lands in the newly established *El Nacional* declared on May 11, 1852,

> . . . when on the western bank of the Paraná, from Corrientes down to Santa Fe, one may see ten or twenty towns spring up; when the banks of the Colorado and Río Negro may be the site of numerous emigrant colonies that extend and link up with the provinces of Cuyo. Then the Argentine Republic will also be able to bring from the markets of Europe all the millions it wants for improvements and scatter this immense capital among the people; or turn its ports into free ports, taking in enough through permanent and fixed internal revenues so as to depend no longer on the vagaries of customs duties. (*El Nacional*, May 11, 1852)

While they succeeded fairly quickly in implanting their repertoire of parliamentary, public-sphere oriented practices as the norm in Buenos Aires, the liberals' commitment to do so throughout a reconstituted Argentine Republic faced imposing obstacles in the form of the committed practitioners of the caudillista repertoire (who, indeed, knew no other mode of practicing politics): General Urquiza and his fellow governors of the littoral and interior provinces and their respective networks of lesser caudillos and clients.

Liberal Buenos Aires and the federalist caudillos

The collapse of Rosas posed anew the question of Argentina's "national organization," exposing fissures both within and between the quasisovereign provinces. In launching his rebellion against Rosas, General Urquiza had withdrawn Entre Ríos's delegation to Buenos Aires of the power to conduct foreign affairs and called on his fellow governors to likewise reassert provincial sovereignty. Only Virasoro of Corrientes did so, but upon Rosas's collapse all the governors shifted their allegiance to Urquiza. To consolidate his new position as caudillo-in-chief, Urquiza

convened a gathering of governors or their delegates at San Nicolás de los Arroyos on the Buenos AiresBSanta Fe border. He acted under long-ignored provisions of the Federal Pact of 1831, which called for a commission of the initial signatories (Buenos Aires, Entre Ríos, and Santa Fe) to

> . . . invite all the other provinces of the republic . . . to unite in federation with the three littoral ones; and by means of a General Federative Congress to organize the general administration of the country under the federal system: its domestic and foreign commerce, its navigation, the collection and distribution of the general revenue, and the payment of the republic's debts, taking into account in the best possible way the security and overall stature of the republic, its domestic and foreign credit, and the sovereignty, freedom and independence of each one of the provinces. (Article 15, Paragraph 5 of the Federal Pact, quoted from complete text in Cragnolino and Schwarzstein 1984: 67)

The San Nicolás conference -- all the participants of which were former clients of Rosas -- issued a call for a constitutional congress at which each province would have an equal number of voting delegates (two per province). The conferees also appointed Urquiza as "provisional director" of the Confederation and conferred upon him extraordinary powers.

The newly elected legislature of Buenos Aires -- by far the most populous and prosperous province -- balked at this arrangement and asserted its right to ratify or reject the San Nicolás agreement, which was presented as a fait accompli by Buenos Aires Governor Vicente López y Planes, a longtime Rosista functionary handpicked for the post by Urquiza. This incipient porteño rebellion culminated in several days of tumultuous public sessions of the legislature in June 1852. It was in these "June Days" that the gap between the emergent porteño conception of how politics ought to be practiced and that of the federal caudillos first became publicly evident.

The debates in the legislature went on for ten days, with extensive excerpts from the sessions being published in *El Nacional* and other newly established daily newspapers. Objections to the San Nicolás accords themselves centered on what representatives considered the inordinate interim powers granted to General Urquiza and on the failure to give Buenos Aires its due weight in the constitutional congress. *El Nacional* editorialized on June 21,

> The people . . . reject . . . the Directorate created in the said treaty. . . . And that

> protest is just, because it is the expression of the legacy of many years. The peoples now know through a sad and prolonged experience the fatal consequences that have been brought on by the system of personal rule. . . . In order to set up a Congress [the accord] begins by creating a power superior to the Congress itself, conceding to it all the powers of the Republic. . . .
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> The naming of only two deputies for the province of Buenos Aires, which alone makes up a third of the Republic -- thus placing it on a par with San Luis, which has only ten or twelve thousand inhabitants -- this is another of the facts that necessarily has drawn attention against the accords. (*El Nacional*, June 21, 1852)

The session of June 11 debated a motion to demand clarification of the San Nicolás accords from the governor's ministers. Bartolomé Mitre declared:

> Twenty years of tyranny has done its work upon us in such a way that an abuse of power goes by with less notice than the recognition of a right. [But] in every country of the world ministers can be called to the Chamber to give explanations. (El Nacional, June 12, 1852)

Another deputy moved to clear the public galleries so that a secret session might be held with the ministers, but Mitre objected, saying, "In all free countries it's natural that passions become animated when it's a matter that affects them directly; only among enslaved peoples is there no [freedom of] expression." (El Nacional, June 12, 1852)

Mitre elaborated on his vision of parliamentary rule in the session of June 21, in which he expressed gratitude that a point had been reached wherein

> . . . the bloody combats of the battlefield have given way to a peaceful struggle for opinion, in which the sword and spear have been replaced by the restorative weapons of the word and of reason . . . because now differences of opinion are not resolved by means of the lance and in which different ways of seeing and debating an issue are not cause for rancor and death. (*El Nacional*, June 23, 1852)

But this parliamentary utopia was not to be. On June 23 Governor López y Planes presented his resignation to the legislature, objecting that "there has erupted an opposition both within and outside this honorable chamber, which is incompatible with [my] remaining at the head of the Province." (*El Nacional*, June 23, 1852) Immediately thereafter, General Urquiza ordered the legislature dissolved, imposed press censorship, and deported Mitre and four other legislators. On July 26, Urquiza personally assumed the governorship of Buenos Aires and appointed a Council of State composed of equal numbers of Rosistas and anti-Rosistas. (Bosch 1971: 255-56, 260)

Upon departing for the Constitutional Congress in Santa Fe on September 3, 1852, Urquiza left an interim governor in Buenos Aires. This provided an opening for a liberal counterattack. Asserting claims to *libertad*, they mounted a successful coup d'etat in September 1852 and issued a manifesto calling on the other provinces to join the revolt.

But the porteños failed to rally support among the other provinces.

By mid-1853, Buenos Aires had in effect seceded from the Confederation. Nearly a decade of intermittent civil war followed. For its part, the Confederation remained a congeries of caudillo-run provinces, despite the new constitutional framework. General Urquiza held the office of president but in practice ruled in the Rosas style as "caudillo of caudillos." (Oszlak 1982: 58-69; Scobie 1964: 107-112)

The Confederation collapsed in 1862 and was supplanted by the República Argentina, now under the domination of Buenos Aires. The new authorities carried out military campaigns against the less corrigible interior caudillos,

and found mutual interests with and provided concessions to other provincial leaders, particularly those of the export-oriented littoral provinces.

During the ten-year interregnum when Buenos Aires remained separated, the elites of that province debated among themselves the course of action to follow: whether the province should persist as an autonomous polity, within or outside the Argentine Confederation, or instead take the initiative in setting up a more centralized state -- in their terms, "organize the Argentine nation." It is these debates over *la organización nacional*, the shifting political forms in which they were conducted, their socioeconomic and geopolitical context, the alternatives available and the choices made that this dissertation will explore.

There were essentially three alternatives -- not necessarily mutually exclusive -- available to Buenos Aires when it came to reorganizing the provincial regime and its relations with the other provinces after Rosas's fall:

1. Accept the constitutional framework of the Confederation, thereby relinquishing Buenos Aires's monopoly on customs revenue and other prerogatives (the *federalista* or *constitucionalista* position);

2. Through a combination of military force and concession of certain prerogatives, re-establish and fortify Buenos Aires's hegemony over the remaining provinces and organize a central state based on the port (the *nacionalista* position); or

3. Acknowledge and affirm Buenos Aires's de facto status as an independent state; at the extreme, proclaim full sovereignty and accept the military and diplomatic consequences thereof (the *autonomista* position). (It should be noted that the labels *autonomista* and *nacionalista* referred only to this internal Argentine question and did not imply analogous positions regarding foreign interference or domination.)

As at other turning points in Argentine history, a considerable part of elite politics in Buenos Aires during the 1850s involved contention over these alternatives.

Support for each approach ebbed and flowed according to the perceived chances of success, the way interests would be affected, and the geopolitical context. Elections to the legislature and executive were often contested on this ground; pamphleteers, journalists and public orators launched polemics; and sporadic military clashes occurred both among the Buenos Aires factions and between Buenos Aires and the Confederation.

Alone of the provinces, Buenos Aires enjoyed the sort of advantages that could have made it viable as an independent state.* It controlled the sole international port of any note and was in a position to control interior navigation. Its merchant-landholders were becoming fabulously wealthy from the booming export economy. But for these very same reasons, the other provinces would have been hard put to tolerate such an independent Buenos Aires. An open declaration of porteño independence would likely have entailed fullscale war against the Confederation. Would the

*But what about a mespotamian republic of Entre Ríos + Corrientes? Would have had to link up with Uruguay/ Montevideo, and either confront or seek protection of Brazil. A project briefly considered by Urquiza in late 1850s.

porteño dominant class have been willing to tolerate such an effort? Historically, they had put up sharp and decisive resistance against the war with Brazil in the 1820s, and had abstained from any active defense of Rosas in 1850-51 when the latter's moves toward a renewal of war against Paraguay and Brazil precipitated the coalescence of his enemies throughout the region.* Note also Incipient "peace party" 1857-59 around La Reforma Pacífica etc.

The specifically political conflicts between liberals and caudillos in the 1850s-70s were interwoven with the chronic Platine contention over customs revenue, river navigation, and other class and regional interests.** While mid-century contention was indeed about political practices as well as economic interests, demonstrating a clash of and a shift in political repertoires is not sufficient to explain why Buenos Aires emerged at the hub of a relatively unitary state with oligarchic-parliamentary institutions.

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*See Rube, *Hacia Caseros* (Memorial de la Patria 1850-52).

**Stress how such conflicts were ostensibly (formally/legally) resolved in 1852 and again in 1859-60, and how economic/fiscal settlements repeatedly became unstuck because of political conflicts.

While this outcome was facilitated by the changes in political practices (e.g., parliamentary forms provided mechanisms for settling inter-provincial conflicts without resort to arms), it had also to do with shifts in the geopolitical context and in the political economy both global and regional. Most crucially, shifts in the political economy altered the pace at which resources became available to the respective bearers of the conflicting repertoires, i.e., to the would-be statebuilders of Buenos Aires and to the caudillos of the Confederation (see Figure 2, page ?). Control over the rapidly mounting resources of the port province proved to be crucially important to the success of the porteño liberal current -- exemplified by Bartolomé Mitre -- which gained control over the Buenos Aires provincial state in September 1852 and maintained it throughout the period.* The outcome was thus *both* a Buenos Aires-centered state *and* the institutionalization of a

*Except for a brief interlude in late 1859 and early 1860 as a consequence of Buenos Aires's defeat at the battle of Cepeda.

parliamentary regime, one paradigmatic of the type Mouzelis has termed "oligarchic parliamentarism":*

> . . . a system of government where active politics was the concern of a handful of notable families, these families managing to maintain a liberal, pluralistic system of representation (with the usual freedoms of speech, association, and so on) while at the same time keeping the bulk of the lower classes excluded from the political arena. . . .
>
> [In such regimes,] the typical political forces consist of loose associations of notables, of political clubs rather than well-organised parties with a mass following. . . . (Mouzelis 1986: 3-4)

The political-economic constraints that facilitated the outcome of a relatively unitary state centered on Buenos Aires can be further clarified through the analysis of counterfactual outcomes, such as a Buenos Aires-centered state in which caudillista practices would have remained predominant, or the persistence of fragmented sovereignty

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*That the outcome was "oligarchic" parliamentarism and not a more democratic variety was owing to a particular configuration of agency and structure:
(1) the liberals' wariness of popular participation as a consequence of their interactions with the caudillistas through 1870 (above all, fear of *montoneras* and rosista-type terror); and (2) constraints on wider popular participation rooted in the still archaic social structure (widespread illiteracy, transience of most immigrants until the 1890s, the persistence of patron-client relationships...).

among states where parliamentary practices nonetheless took hold. The "elective affinities" between different possible configurations of the political economy and various political-institutional outcomes are sketched in Figure 3. The different political currents present in the Plata provinces in the 1850s that were practitioners or advocates of certain of these alternative outcomes are mapped in Figure 4.*

Changes in the political economy provided the Buenos Aires liberals with the resources to accomplish their statebuilding project, but the project itself was not in the first instance determined by changes in the political economy.** That is, the economic transition was not bound

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*Follow with textual exposition of charted material, then condense charts into a more readable form.

**I.e., it was not a "class project" in the Marxist sense. As Nicos Mouzelis has written concerning the fin-de-siècle transition from oligarchic parliamentarism to early populism, the fact that members of the economically dominant class are to be found in conflicting political camps

> ... should not *a priori* exclude the possibility that these groups may be differentiated along political rather than economic lines ... because of their differential access to political power (in which case an analysis exclusively in terms of class fractions would not go very far). ... [T]here should ... be

ipso facto to make available a reservoir of state personnel trained in and oriented to parliamentary and public-sphere

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> concepts available allowing the researcher to pose the alternative as a *possibility*, as a *hypothesis to be investigated*. At the present time the idea prevails in the Marxist tradition that all political conflicts, in so far as they are amenable to structural explanations, can be explained adequately in terms of economic categories. ... Therefore a situation in which social actors belonging to the same class or class fraction are *structurally* divided because of their differential access to the means of domination is theoretically unthinkable [in a Marxist interpretation]. (Mouzelis 1986: 210, emphasis in original)

Note also Carlos Forment's assertion that the formation of political groupings must be "examined in relation to political practice, to the interplay of culture and power":

> When the regime is in crisis, when its socio-institutional structures (for example: state apparatus, social stratification system, economic markets), and cultural rules are unravelling then, by definition, they cannot organize everyday life. . . . [W]e need to pay much closer attention to the way political practices shape group formation. Once formed, these groups will engage in practices aimed at either buttressing old, declining structures or hastening the formation of newly emerging ones. (Forment 1991a: 39-40)

[Update using more recent Forment papers/publications? Is explicit critique of Forment appropriate inasmuch as he hasn't really published his views in final form yet?]

practices.* Under the circumstances of the Plata in the 1850s, such a set of personnel could only have come from without, but historical events of the preceding decade had indeed provided such a collection of parliamentary-oriented individuals. The initial leading cadres of the Buenos Aires-centered state had assimilated a parliamentary repertoire through the lived experiences of exile in other polities during the 1840s -- in Chile, Montevideo, France, Britain and the United States. This dissertation is in part the story of what happened when they interacted with the practitioners of the distinctly different political repertoire that had been common to Platine actors since the late 1820s, and how this interaction mattered to the state-formation outcome.

At the same time, the outcome of state-formation in Argentina was facilitated to an important degree by changes in the economic context in which the shifting political

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*See Bensel Proseminar comments re "resource endowments favoring a parliamentary regime (liquid wealth, influence over national media/publics, training in or easy access to judicial administration of legal affairs...)."

Conversely, consider resource endowments favoring a caudillista regime - military aptitude, equestrian skills, mobilizable gauchos, landed wealth....

repertoires were embedded -- i.e., the momentous mid-century transition from cattle products to wool, oxcarts to railroads, sloops to steamboats, messengers on horseback to telegraph lines, etc. These material changes made the older repertoire more costly in some ways (e.g., flocks of purebred sheep were more costly to maintain than free-ranging cattle but were far more vulnerable in times of rural warfare; sheepraising required a sedentary work force that was less available for frequent military mobilization than were the mobile *gauchos* who tended the cattle herds), and facilitated the newer one in others (e.g., far more rapid and efficient overland transport and communications, which enhanced the circulation of printed media and of provincial elites themselves). This in turn helped to create a consensual context wherein elites from diverse regions, practicing the new repertoire, could bargain over their conflicting interests in the national legislature and in other less formal ways rather than by resort to armed rebellion or encouragement of foreign intervention.[*]

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[*]This paragraph is central to the entire dissertation and needs to be much more thoroughly elaborated, into an entire chapter at least. (See Carmenza proseminar

Centralized states, parliamentary institutions

This dissertation has directed attention to (1) the shifting and conflicting political repertoires practiced by would-be statemaking elites in mid-nineteenth century Argentina; and (2) the way that changes in the global and regional political economy catalyzed and constrained (a) the shift in repertoires in particular and (b) the formation of a national state more generally. It remains to account additionally for (1) the domination of the emergent national state by the port city of Buenos Aires and its surrounding province; and (2) the fact that this state was from the outset endowed with parliamentary institutions, contested elections, a partisan press, and formal recognition of civil liberties.

The determinants of regime type and the conditions under which centralized national states emerged have long been central questions in political science and historical sociology. While analytically separable, these objects of inquiry have been closely bound up with each other in

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comments.)

historical experience. In the modern period, state centralization has typically been accompanied by the presence of parliamentary institutions; the latter have facilitated the peaceable settlement of inter-regional or inter-provincial conflicts when large, multiregional states are emerging out of situations of fragmented sovereignty. Salient European cases are the unification of Germany and Italy in the nineteenth century, and an important Latin American case is the consolidation of independent Brazil during the same period. In each of these instances, monarchical institutions were present and played an arbitral role among contending regions, but regional representation was also provided for in parliamentary bodies. Regarding parliamentarism and state-formation, see if there's anything in P.Anderson (*Lineages...*), Gramsci, SSRC volumes on political development. The absence of a monarchy in the multiregional Argentine Republic suggests that parliamentary forms -- or some surrogate therefor -- were all the more important for successful state centralization. If not a parliament *per se*, then a political sphere or institutional arena wherein regionally rooted elites could interact and

negotiate without resort to arms -- in other words, to examine how intermittent diplomacy between quasisovereign provinces turned into ongoing renegotiation of a national pact of domination between regionally rooted elites. The transition with which this dissertation is concerned is one from warfare in a situation of multiple sovereignty to bargaining within the framework of a central state. This does not rule out altogether the resort to military forms of bargaining -- witness the rebellions in the 1890s by the Unión Cívica and its successors, the *Radicales*. But it does point up the waning of *interprovincial* conflict, the last gasp of which was an 1880 uprising led by Buenos Aires Governor Carlos Tejedor against the federalization of the capital city.

Political actors in the Río de la Plata had long been exposed to the notion of a federal, parliamentary republic. Early attempts to write a constitution (1816-19, 1824-26) had been inspired by the model of the United States. But these efforts were stillborn, giving way to a quarter century of fragmented sovereignty and intermittent civil war among caudillo-dominated provinces. Thus two additional

features of the Argentine political landscape at mid-century were important to the consolidation of a central state with a parliamentary regime, one of which had to do with agency and the other with structure:

1. a network of elite individuals with practical experience in parliamentary and public-sphere politics and the political will to generalize these practices in the Argentine space; and

2. changes in the political economy that created a context conducive to the adoption of such practices.

These factors came together during the conjuncture of the 1850s when the liberal network gained power in Buenos Aires at a time when a series of momentous economic shifts were under way.

At the same time, it must be acknowledged that the outcome was "oligarchic" parliamentarism,* and not a more

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*Of the sort characterized by Mouzelis as "a system of government where active politics was the concern of a handful of notable families, these families managing to maintain a liberal, pluralistic system of representation (with the usual freedoms of speech, association, and so on) while at the same time keeping the bulk of the lower classes excluded from the political arena. . . ." In such regimes,

robust, democratic variety. This, again, was owing to a particular configuration of agency and structure:

1. the liberals' wariness of popular participation as a consequence of their interactions with the caudillistas through 1870 (above all, fear of *montoneras* and rosista-type terror); and

2. constraints on wider popular participation were rooted in the still archaic social structure -- widespread illiteracy, transience of most immigrants until the 1890s, and the persistence of patron-client relationships; indeed, patron-client relationships remained a strong feature of the political order, even though the upper-level patrons were transformed from militaristic caudillos to members of parliament, government ministers, provincial governors, and chiefs of bureaucratic departments.

These issues are of interest not only for their intrinsic value to historiographic clarification: State

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"the typical political forces consist of loose associations of notables, of political clubs rather than well-organised parties with a mass following. ..." (Mouzelis 1986: 3-4)

centralization and the implantation of parliamentary institutions of a specific kind in the Southern Cone of Latin America in the mid-nineteenth century put in place the historically sedimented structural constraints that would condition further rounds of state/regime transition in the twentieth century.*

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Additional considerations/speculations:

A. The transition from caudillismo to parliamentarism is incomplete or circumscribed

1. inasmuch as patron-client relationships remain a strong feature of the political order (but the upper-level patrons are transformed from militaristic caudillos to members of parliament, government ministers, provincial governors, and chiefs of bureaucratic departments) and

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*This is the starting point for Nicos Mouzelis's *Politics in the Semi-periphery: Early Parliamentarism and Late Industrialization in the Balkans and Latin America* (New York: St. Martins Press, 1986).

2. or perhaps is mis-characterized -- the real transition we're concerned with is the one from warfare in situation of multiple sovereignty to bargaining within framework of central state. This does not rule out resort to military bargaining altogether -- e.g., 1890s rebellions by Unión Cívica and *radicales* -- but does point up the waning of interprovincial conflict. Contrast 1880 Tejedor rebellion to 1890 UC rising.

B. Parliamentary institutions as loci of interprovincial bargaining:*

1. Consider US Congress as such a locus from the outset, or indeed from the Constitutional Convention on. N/S compromises over slavery: 3/5 clause, Missouri Compromise, Compromise of 1850, etc. After Civil War, Compromise of 1877, New Deal bargaining (cf. Katznelson on race & ND), etc.

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*Regarding parliamentarism and state-formation, see if there's anything in P.Anderson (*Lineages...*), Gramsci, SSRC volumes on political development.

2. More generally, one could ask to what extent electoral regimes matter when central states are formed out of situations of multiple regional sovereignty: I.e., the difference between territorial districting, single-member districts, 1st-past-the-post elections etc. such as in USA, as vs. systems of proportional representation via national party slates as in France. (Cf. also Philippines after 1898, where US system imposed by colonial power.) Issue of federalism vs. centralism obviously relevant here.
3. Territorial representation may facilitate interprovincial bargaining, but can also perpetuate regional particularism and insulate provincial elites from actions of central state -- besides US case, cf. Italy, where "cooperation between the northern bourgeoisie and the southern landed (rental) capitalistic forces entailed a *lack of direct impingement of the southern periphery by the*

centre. . . ." (Eisenstadt and Roniger 1984: 66n)

C. Compare other situations where parliamentary repertoires are 1) passed down, 2) imported, or 3) introduced:

1. Passed down in North America from British colonial assemblies via continental congresses to post-Independence state legislatures and national Congress (Lang 1975: nn)
2. Imported by exiles into [?]
3. Introduced by colonial powers into India, Philippines, Puerto Rico, Cuba . . .*

D. Re undermining or transformation of clientelismo as changes unfold in political economy, see Eisenstadt and Roniger 1984: 67 re southern Italy.

The two variables considered in this project to have greatest effect upon the emergence (or pace of emergence) of parliamentary regimes in the new states of post-Independence

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*Re Cuba, a combination of exile importation and colonial introduction: See Pérez 1986: 38ff and Pérez 1983: 304ff, re limits of US efforts to insure election of "better classes" to Constitutional Convention of 1900.

Latin America are essentially two: (1) the availability of a personnel cadre with knowledge of, experience in, and/or commitment to parliamentary practices; and (2) a socioeconomic and/or geopolitical situation conducive to the stabilization of a parliamentary regime. We have demonstrated how these variables interacted to produce such a regime in Argentina after 1862. Now let us test the applicability of the model to comparative study of other Latin American cases. Keeping in mind that our variables change across both time and space, let us construct a simple four-fold table as a first approximation to solving the problem:

Geopolitical/Socioeconomic Constraints Personnel/ Practices Endowment	**Conducive**	**Adverse**
Rich	Argentina 1862- Chile 1830- Uruguay 18??-	
Sparse	Chile pre-1830	Venezuela Bolivia Paraguay Ecuador

NOTES

1. The situation of shepherds working on shares was precarious, however. When the market contracted sharply (though temporarily) in 1866-67 as a result of the end of civil war in the United States and the imposition of a steep wool tariff there, only those sheep producers who owned their own land had the resources to withstand the crisis. Holdings were reconcentrated and a marked shift toward wage labor and away from share arrangements took place. (Gorostegui de Torres 1972: 100)

2. For a particularly acute discussion of the emergence of a "public sphere" in Buenos Aires after mid-century, see Sabato 1992 and Sabato and Palti 1990; for a literary treatment, see Lucio V. López's 1884 novel, *La Gran Aldea* (López 1980).